Speaker:

Mengfan Ma (Ph.D. student in University of Electronic Science and Technology of China)

Time:

• 16:20-17:20 (Time in Beijing)
• 21:20-22:20 (Time in Auckland)
• March 11, 2022 (Friday)

Venue:

B1-518B, Research Building 4

Abstract:

In mechanism design, the facility location game is an extensively studied problem. In the classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. We consider a general model, where there is a location-dependent entrance fee to the facility. Thus, in our model, the cost of each agent is the sum of the distance to the facility and the entrance fee of the facility. This is a refined generalization of the classical model. We study the model and design strategyproof mechanisms. For one and two facilities, we provide upper and lower bounds of the approximation ratio with respect to the utilitarian objective and the egalitarian objective. These bounds are independent of the entrance fee functions.

This a joint work with Mingyu Xiao and Bakh Khoussainov.